To Grab for the Market or to Bide One's Time: A Dynamic Model of Entry
构建了一个同时行动、动态进入的博弈模型，其中进入的固定成本是私人信息。模型刻画了唯一的对称序贯均衡，并推导了比较静态结果。
We consider a simultaneous-move, dynamic-entry game. The fixed cost of entry is private information. Entering earlier increases the likelihood of being the monopolist but also increases the likelihood of coordination failure and simultaneous entry. We consider general continuous distributions for the fixed cost, and we characterize the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in pure strategies. Comparative-statics results are derived. As the time between rounds approaches zero, all of the “action” occurs during an arbitrarily small amount of time. For the Bertrand model, we extend the analysis to allow for n firms.