Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second‐Price Auctions
研究重复第二价格拍卖中，标价如何影响不同经验水平的投标者行为，发现标价只影响新手投标者，且策略行为在两次试验后减弱。
Abstract Examining panel data on bidding behavior in over forty second‐price auction markets with repeated trials, we observe that ( i ) posted prices influence the behavior of the median naive bidder; ( ii ) posted prices do not affect the behavior of the median experienced bidder or the bidder for familiar goods; and ( iii ) anticipated strategic behavior wanes after two trials. The results suggest that while affiliation might exist in auctions for new goods, the repeated trial design with nonprice information removes the correlation of values and provides the experience that bidders need to understand the market mechanism.