A Multisector Model of Efficiency Wages
构建了一个多部门效率工资模型，企业内生选择努力水平。易监督或低离职率的工作努力程度高但工资可能较低。实证监督指标导致的工资差异小于行业差异，更接近模型预测。工人可搜寻在职机会，部门增长或失业率变化不影响工资差异模式。
The pattern of effort and wages is derived in a multisector efficiency wage model. Firms choose effort endogenously. Easily monitored or low-turnover jobs have high effort and may have low wages in equilibrium. Empirical wage differentials from a measure of supervision are smaller than observed industry differentials that have been attributed to efficiency wage models and are closer to those predicted by the model. Workers can search for and avail of on-the-job offers. If sectors grow at different rates or the unemployment rate changes, the pattern of wage differentials is unaffected. Copyright 1999 by University of Chicago Press.