A theory of delegated search for the best alternative
研究了委托人如何通过合同设计激励代理人搜索最优替代方案，发现最优合同包含绩效截止日期和提前完成奖金，并分析了不同绩效可指定程度下的合同形式。
Searching for the best worker, a reliable supply alternative, or the most profitable investment is frequently delegated to an agent. This article develops a theory of delegated search. We show that the principal’s ability to delegate depends on the agent’s luck, her initial resources, and the contract that governs her search. With moral hazard, the optimal contract is characterized by performance deadlines with bonuses for early completion. If performance cannot be specified, the optimal search is implemented by an option‐to‐buy contract for the principal. If performance is partially specified, the optimal contract is a standard pay‐for‐performance arrangement.