USING RESERVE PRICES TO DETER COLLUSION IN PROCUREMENT COMPETITION*
定量评估了采购方如何通过选择保留价来影响两种合谋方案的可持续性，发现即使温和的策略性保留价选择也能大幅缩小合谋可持续的折现因子范围，表明采购方有工具促使卖方竞争。
To enhance our understanding of collusion in procurement settings, this paper quantitatively evaluates how the buyer's choice of a reserve price influences the sustainability of two previously devised collusive schemes. If the buyer does not select its reserve price strategically, then collusion may be sustainable for a wide range of plausible discount factors. However, even mildly sophisticated reserve price selection can dramatically shrink the set of discount factors for which collusion is sustainable. These findings support existing arguments that buyers are vulnerable to collusion, but they also suggest that buyers possess tools that may profitably induce sellers to act competitively.