State Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of New York's 1985 Takeover Statutes
通过事件研究法分析纽约州1985年两项收购法规的净效应，发现尽管法规提高了成功被收购目标股东的溢价，但总体上事前损害了股东利益，支持了Jarrell和Bradley的结论。
Past studies of takeover regulations have found that such rules increase the premiums paid to the shareholders of successfully acquired targets. Jarrell and Bradley argue that these higher premiums harm shareholders by discouraging takeover activity and protecting inefficient managers. Bebchuk argues that the higher premiums do not significantly reduce the number of takeovers so that shareholders benefit, on average, from the higher premiums paid in successful acquisitions. This article uses the event study method to measure the net effect of two takeover statutes passed by the New York State Legislature in 1985. The results support the conclusion of Jarrell and Bradley that, despite the higher premiums paid to successfully acquired target shareholders ex post, these laws, on average, harm shareholders ex ante.