A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health
利用农户面板数据，通过健康、消费和工作时间信息，检验不同支付方案（计件工资、计时工资、分成租佃）对工人努力程度的影响，发现计时工资和分成租佃会降低努力，且计件工资下工人摄入更多卡路里。
Moral hazard plays a central role in many models depicting contractual relationships involving worker effort. The authors show how time-series information on worker health, consumption, and work time can be used to measure the effort effects of payment schemes. Estimates from longitudinal data describing farming rural households indicate that time-wage payment schemes and share-tenancy contracts reduce effort compared to piece-rate payment schemes and on-farm employment. The evidence also indicates, consistent with moral hazard, that the same workers consume more calories under a piece-rate payment scheme or in on-farm employment than when employed for time wages. Copyright 1994 by MIT Press.