The dilemmas of market socialism: Capital market reform in China ‐ part I: Bonds
从政治经济学视角分析中国债券市场改革，指出债券发行虽多样化但未提升资源配置效率，反而成为政治经济主体争夺资源的工具，反映了半改革社会主义经济的结构性特征。
This two‐part article analyses the attempts to reform the socialist financial system in China by diversifying financial assets and introducing capital markets. The approach used is that of political economy, in the sense of elucidating the interplay between political and economic interests, actors and issues in the reform process. Part I discusses the issue of bonds by governments and enterprises. Although the reform era has seen gradual progress towards something resembling a bond ‘market’ in terms of a diversification of bond types and growing competition between bond issues, there is no evidence that this has improved allocative efficiency in the economy. Rather, bonds have functioned as one instrument in a complex struggle for resources between political, institutional and economic actors in the context of a continuing ‘shortage economy’. This competitive system falls far short of a true ‘market'; rather it embodies powerful systemic factors reflecting the basic structural and institutional features of a semi‐reformed socialist economy. One of these systemic factors is the institution of social ownership of the means of production which has been called into question by the emergence of shares and share markets, a process we discuss in Part II. Share issues have in the event been economically unimportant but politically important since they challenge the ideological and institutional underpinnings of a ‘socialist’ economy. The key to the future of this form of financial liberalisation depends not merely on further progress in complementary areas of economic reform policy, but also on a resolution of these fundamental political issues.