Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting
实验发现投票能改变税收遵从的社会规范，当群体投票反对加强执法后，个人遵从度大幅下降，但群体沟通可恢复接近完全遵从。
This paper argues that there is a social norm of tax compliance that affects individual reporting decisions and that can be affected by voting on different aspects of the fiscal system. Experimental results are consistent with a central role for social norms. Individual compliance after a vote is decidedly different from prevote compliance under the identical fiscal regime, in particular, compliance always falls dramatically after the group signals its rejection of the social norm by voting against greater enforcement. However, the results also suggest that social norms can be affected by group communication; in particular, postvote reporting with communication approaches full compliance. Copyright 1999 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG