Clearinghouse Membership and Deposit Contraction during the Panic of 1907
研究了1907年恐慌期间，纽约和芝加哥的清算所会员资格是否缓解了存款流失，发现会员银行的活期存款收缩小于非会员，这推动了美国中央银行的建立。
Was clearinghouse membership a key factor mitigating withdrawls from intermediaries during the Panic of 1907? Analyzing balnace-sheet information on institutions in New York and Chicago, we find ecidence that clearinghouse memebers had institutions in New York and Chicago, we find evidence that clearinghouse members had smaller contractions in demand deposits than did nonmembers. New York City trusts, isolated from the clearinghouse, were subject to heightened perceptions of risk, and suffered large-scale withdrawals because they were outside of the clearinghouse and therefore much less prepared to withstand large-scale depositor runs. We suggest that this aspect of the Panic of 1907 helped to forge support for the creation of a U.S. central bank.