An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamics of the Welfare State: The Case of Benefit Morale
研究了福利制度对福利道德（即不滥用福利的社会规范）的动态影响，发现高公共支出和高失业率短期内对福利道德有微弱正面影响，但中长期会被负面效应部分抵消。
Does the supply of a welfare state create its own demand? Many economic scholars studying welfare arrangements refer to Say's law and insinuate a self-destructive welfare state. However, little is known about the empirical validity of these assumptions and hypotheses. We study the dynamic effect of different welfare arrangements on benefit fraud. In particular, we analyze the impact of the welfare state on the respective social norm, i.e. benefit morale. It turns out that a high level of public social expenditures and a high unemployment rate are associated with a small positive (or no) immediate impact on benefit morale, which however is (partly) crowded out by adverse medium and long run effects. In contrast to earlier studies we do not find that younger birth cohorts have lower values of benefit morale.