Spinoff/Terminations and the Value of Pension Insurance
计算了养老金福利担保公司（PBGC）在两种情形下的保险价值：允许自愿终止计划，以及仅在企业破产时终止。实证显示PBGC负债远超当前准备金，且分拆/终止操作显著增加了其或有负债的现值。
ABSTRACT This paper derives the value of Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) pension insurance under two scenarios of interest. The first allows for voluntary plan termination, which appears to be legal under current statutes. In the second scenario, termination is prohibited unless the firm is bankrupt. Empirical estimates of PBGC liabilities are calculated. These show that prospective PBGC liabilities greatly exceed current reserves for plan terminations, that even under a bankruptcy‐only termination rule, PBGC liabilities still would be quite sensitive to discretionary funding policy, and that the increasingly common practice of pension spinoff/terminations, substantially increases the present value of the PBGC's contingent liabilities.