The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard
研究了哈佛商学院课程分配中的抽签机制，发现其可被操纵且造成福利损失，但福利仍优于策略防伪替代方案，并设计了改进版抽签。
We use theory and field data to study the draft mechanism used to allocate courses at Harvard Business School. We show that the draft is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause significant welfare loss. Nevertheless, we find that welfare is higher than under its widely studied strategyproof alternative. We identify a new link between fairness and welfare that explains why the draft performs well despite the costs of strategic behavior, and then design a new draft that reduces these costs. We draw several broader lessons for market design, regarding Pareto efficiency, fairness, and strategyproofness.