Electoral Support and the Capture of Legislators: Evidence from North Carolina's Vote on Radioactive Waste Disposal
检验了立法者投票是否代表选区经济利益，发现选举安全度显著影响其投票行为，且较安全的立法者更可能投票支持公共利益。
Empirical tests of Stigler's (1971) theory of economic regulation using roll-call voting of legislators have ignored Stigler's hypothesis that secure legislators behave differently from insecure legislators. In this study of legislator voting on the Southeast Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact in North Carolina, the extent to which legislators' votes represent the economic interests of their geographic constituencies is significantly influenced by the support they expect to receive in reelection campaigns. Moreover, there is weak evidence in favor of Stigler's supposition that more secure legislators are more likely to vote the general interest than are their less secure colleagues.