Earnings, Book Values, and Dividends in a Stewardship Setting with Moral Hazard*
研究在多期代理环境中，股利政策何时不影响激励。发现若会计数据满足标准权益会计且股利是零净现值活动，则股利政策激励无关性成立，并比较了价值无关性与激励无关性的条件差异。
Abstract The paper addresses the following question: in a multiple‐date agency setting, under what conditions will the dividend policy be of no incentive relevancy? It is shown that if the accounting data—earnings, book values, and dividends — satisfy standard owners' equity accounting constructs, and if these indicate that paying dividends is a zero NPV activity, then dividend policy incentive irrelevancy applies. The basic idea is to ensure that the (history of) abnormal (residual) earnings summarize the relevant information and the solution to the incentive problem. The paper also compares classical value irrelevancy with incentive irrelevancy, and the analysis shows that conditions for incentive irrelevancy are more stringent.