Strategic Vertical Differentiation and Durable Goods Monopoly
研究了耐用品垄断企业如何策略性地利用产品质量来解决时间不一致问题，通过低质量产品对高质量市场的侵蚀来优化产品线，并解释了垂直产品差异化的科斯式原因。
This paper considers a novel and strategic use of quality as a means for solving the durable‐goods time inconsistency problem. It demonstrates how durable‐goods producers can exploit the cannibalization of high‐quality markets by low‐quality goods. Relative to the static product line solution, this strategic dimension of quality choice implies higher quality levels of low‐end goods and the production of some low‐end products that would not otherwise be produced. In some cases, low‐end goods may rationally be sold below cost. The paper, therefore, offers a purely Coasian explanation for vertical product differentiation.