Cost‐Sharing Arrangements under Sharecropping: Moral Hazard, Incentive Flexibility, and Risk
解释农村发展中经济体的成本分摊安排，分析不同成本合同的风险和激励特性及其灵活性，指出在劳动投入难以监督时，成本与产出份额相等规则不成立且非帕累托最优，成本分摊合同在信息不对称下优于指定投入水平的合同。
Abstract This paper explains the rationale and describes the characteristics of cost sharing arrangements in rural developing economies, focusing on the risk and incentive properties of alternative cost contracts and on their flexibility—their ability to adapt to environmental changes. It is shown that where labor inputs are difficult to monitor, the rule that cost shares and output shares be equalized will not hold and is not “constrained pareto efficient,” and that cost‐sharing contracts have a decided advantage over contracts which specify the level of inputs whenever there are asymmetries of information regarding production technology between the landlord and the tenant.