Strategic Private Experimentation
研究一个说服者通过私下获取不完美信号并选择性披露来说服决策者的模型，发现信号精度足够高时可通过披露足够多有利信号实现说服，但若可传递信号数量有限且说服者利益过高则说服不可能。
We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent's information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion is impossible if the agent's stakes are too high.