The Information Effects of Analyst Activity at the Announcement of New Equity Issues
用分析师关注度和预测一致性衡量信息不对称，发现分析师关注少、预测分歧大的公司在新股发行公告期股价下跌更严重，且分析师活动也影响公司长期表现。
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that informational asymmetry between managers and investors can explain the negative stock returns around the announcement of new equity. Using analyst following and consensus as proxies for information asymmetry, we observe that announcement period returns are significantly more negative for firms followed by fewer analysts and whose forecasts exhibit less consensus. Our findings hold after controlling for firm size and growth opportunities. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that analyst activity also influences firms' long-term performance. We conclude that the information role of security analysts partially explains the negative stock returns surrounding the announcement of new equity.