On the Failure of Hindsight-Biased Principals to Delegate Optimally
通过简单模型和在线实验（2010年世界杯期间），发现后见之明偏差会导致委托人在授权决策中效率低下，偏差程度高的参与者更常做出非最优授权选择。
With the help of a simple model, we show that the hindsight bias can lead to inefficient delegation decisions. This prediction is tested experimentally. In an online experiment that was conducted during the FIFA World Cup 2010, participants were asked to predict a number of outcomes of the ongoing World Cup and had to recall their assessments after the outcomes had been realized. Their answers were used to construct individual measures of the hindsight bias. The participants also had to make choices in a delegation game. Our data confirm that hindsight-biased subjects more frequently fail to delegate optimally than subjects whom we have classified as not hindsight biased. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2087 . This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, judgment and decision making.