Information Acquisition in a War of Attrition
研究了消耗战中玩家在随机截止时间前学习影响收益的状态时，信息的可验证性如何影响信息获取激励和效率，发现不可验证性虽造成扭曲但鼓励信息获取，且小成本下两种效应抵消使期望收益相同。
We consider a war of attrition where the players can learn about a state that determines their payoffs at stochastic deadline. We study how the incentives to acquire information depend on the (un) verifiability of information and its implications for efficiency. Unverifiability creates distortions (strategic delay in concession or duplication in information acquisition), but encourages information acquisition. In our model, provided that the information acquisition cost is small, these two effects cancel each other out and the players' expected payoffs in symmetric equilibrium are identical whether information is verifiable or not. We also show that shortening deadlines may prolong the conflict.