RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT: THEORY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS*
构建了一个城乡区域模型，分析城市效率工资导致的失业与农村边际生产率就业的均衡，发现降低城市失业救济金能减少迁移和增加城市就业，而就业补贴可能因吸引更多迁移反而加剧城市失业。
ABSTRACT We develop a regional model where, in the city, unemployment prevails because of too high (efficiency) wages, while, in the rural area, workers are paid at their marginal productivity. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium and show that it is unique. We then consider two policies: decreasing urban unemployment benefits and subsidizing urban employment. We find that decreasing the unemployment benefit in the city creates urban jobs and reduces rural–urban migration since new migrants have to spend some time unemployed before they can find a job in the city. On the other hand, raising employment subsidies increases urban employment but may also increase urban unemployment because it triggers more rural–urban migration. In this respect, the employment subsidy policy can backfire by raising rather than reducing urban unemployment.