Safeguarding Common-Pool Resources in Transition Economies: Experimental Evidence from Central Asia
实验发现，转型后期经济体的个体在公共池塘资源困境中的合作倾向并不低于转型早期，这与传统预期相反，对理论和实践有启示。
Abstract Empirical evidence suggests that the propensity to cooperate in common pool resource dilemmas is higher for small, homogeneous groups with efficacious monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. Given that transition from socialist to market economies is associated with larger, more heterogeneous groups with diluted opportunities for monitoring and sanctioning, individuals in later-stage transition economies may be expected to be less cooperative than their early-stage counterparts. However, evidence from experiments conducted with subjects in two economies at different stages of transition suggests that this may not be the case. These findings have implications for both theorists and practitioners alike.