Promotion and Optimal Retirement
构建了一个包含离职成本、职位与经验决定的生产率函数以及员工效用函数的模型，分析企业如何通过工资和雇佣安排实现利润最大化，并发现企业可能有动机鼓励员工在保留工资超过边际产品之前退休。
In this paper, a firm maximizes profits over choices of wage schedules and hiring schedules in a model with (1) turnover costs, (2) a productivity function that depends on position and experience, and (3) employee utility functions that depend on monetary compensation and position. It is shown that firms may have reason to encourage employees to retire before their reservation wage is greater than their marginal product. However, if an alternative definition of marginal product is used, the usual relation holds.