Investment under Uncertainty in Dynamic Conflicts
分析两个群体在每期争夺奖品的动态冲突模型，假设现状偏见使昨日赢家占优，研究攻击现状的战略时机，发现攻击阈值低于单期博弈，且改变现状所需支出相对奖品较低，为塔洛克的寻租悖论提供解释。
This paper analyses a model in which two groups repeatedly compete with each other for a prize in every time period. We assume that there is a status quo bias: if there is a fight today, yesterday's winner is in a stronger position than the other group. Hence, a change of the status quo has long-term consequences that groups need to take into account. Important applications of this model include lobbying for legislation and political transitions through revolutions. We analyse the strategic timing of attacks on the status quo, which is similar to investment decisions under uncertainty. We find that the attack threshold is considerably lower than in a comparable one-period game, and that the expenditure level necessary to change the status quo is low in comparison to the prize; this provides a possible solution to Tullock's “rent-seeking paradox” in lobbying. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.