Favorable versus Unfavorable Recommendations: The Impact on Analyst Access to Management‐Provided Information
研究分析师发布有利或不利股票推荐后，管理层是否区别对待信息提供，发现有利推荐后分析师预测准确性提升更大，但该效应在公平披露法规实施后消失。
ABSTRACT This study examines recent regulatory and practitioner concerns that managers provide more (less) information to analysts with more (less) favorable stock recommendations. We examine the relative forecast accuracy of analysts before and after a recommendation issuance under the assumption that increases (decreases) in management‐provided information will increase (decrease) analysts' relative forecast accuracy. We find that analysts issuing more favorable recommendations experience a greater increase in their relative forecast accuracy compared with analysts with less favorable recommendations. Additional tests on the change in frequency with which analysts issue forecasts independent of or in conjunction with other analysts after their recommendation change yield corroborating results. In addition, we find that the greater increase in relative accuracy for analysts with more favorable recommendations exists prior to the passage of Regulation FD but not after. The combined results are consistent with analysts receiving relatively more management‐provided information following the issuance of more favorable recommendations.