Regulatory Deterrence and Registered Insider Trading: The Case of Tender Offers
研究1984年《内幕交易制裁法》通过后，更严格的监管和执法如何减少了要约收购目标公司注册内部人在收购前几周的交易量和盈利性。
Empirical studies of insider trading regulation suggest that regulators have been ineffective in deterring illegal insider trading in the 1960s and 1970s. This paper investigates the impact of the passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), which dramatically increased the potential penalties associated with insider trading. We examine both the incidence and the profitability of the transactions of registered insiders in firms which were the targets of tender offers. Our results indicate that the adoption of more stringent regulations and more active enforcement reduced both the volume and the profitability of trading by registered insiders of target firms in the weeks preceding tender offers.