Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Do Dynamic Incentives Matter?
利用雇主提供的健康保险和Medicare D部分数据，研究发现个人对年底未来价格有显著反应，表明动态激励影响医疗利用，对分析健康保险道德风险有启示。
Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healthcare utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that, because annual coverage usually resets every January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial ("spot") price of healthcare but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price. We find a statistically significant response of initial utilization to the future price, rejecting the null that individuals respond only to the spot price. We discuss implications for analysis of moral hazard in health insurance.