Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
研究在完全信息下，如何通过有限机制实现社会选择函数，要求策略在迭代剔除弱占优后达到虚拟实施。结果表明，只要玩家不少于三人，任何社会选择函数都可实现，且机制是有限且允许混合策略的。
The authors investigate the implementation of social choice functions that map to lotteries over alternatives. They require virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies. Under very weak domain restrictions, they show that if there are three or more players, any social choice function may be so implemented. The literature on implementation in Nash equilibrium and its refinements is compromised by its reliance on game forms with unnatural features (for example, integer games) or modulo constructions with mixed strategies arbitrarily excluded. In contrast, the authors' results employ finite (consequently well-behaved) mechanisms and allow for mixed strategies.