Financing Public Goods
比较了通过直接征税和补贴私人支出来融资公共物品的效率与分配效应，发现当公私支出一对一替代时补贴更高效，并分析了混合物品与纯公共物品的差异以及不同收入纳税人的偏好。
Public goods can be financed by direct taxation or a subsidy to private spending. This paper examines the relative efficiency and distributional consequences of the two methods. Efficiency is shown to depend on the price elasticity of private spending and the trade- off between public and private spending. When this trade-off is dollar for dollar, however, a subsidy is always more efficient than direct taxation. The gains from a subsidy are larger for a mixed good than for a pure public good. Looking a t distributional effects, the author shows when richer taxpayers may prefer a tax credit to deductibility, even though they face lower prices with deductibility, and also shows when richer taxpayers prefer direct taxation to either type of subsidy. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.