Group credit: A means to improve information transfer and loan repayment performance
利用哥斯达黎加FINCA团体信贷项目数据，研究团体信贷能否通过传递借款人信用信息来降低违约率，发现筛选成员的团体违约率更低，但多数团体经济回报为负，说明该机制对成本敏感。
Information asymmetries plague credit markets in developing countries, leading to selective rationing and market segmentation with adverse income distributional consequences for small borrowers. Data collected from the FINCA group credit programme in Costa Rica were used to study the viability and cost effectiveness of group credit as a means to transmit information on borrower creditworthiness. Groups that screened members and used local information had lower delinquency rates than those that did not. However, less than half the groups had positive rates of economic return, suggesting that group lending may improve information flow but is a cost‐sensitive institutional design.