Management Ownership and Firm Compensation Policy: Evidence from Converting Savings and Loan Associations
研究储蓄贷款协会转制为股份制公司后，管理层持股与薪酬之间的关系，发现管理层持股比例不同时，利益趋同假说和壕沟假说均成立。
We examine the relationship between management ownership and compensation for a sample of savings and loan associations which have recently converted to stock organizations. Previous expense preference literature has indicated that the stock form of organization lessens the potential for non-value-maximizing behavior that may be manifested in the payment of employee compensation. Our results confirm those of Morck, et al, which suggest that support for the convergence of interests hypothesis (management acts in the interests of the owners) and the entrenchment hypotheses (management acts in its own interests) is conditional on the magnitude of management ownership in the firm.