Bank Bailouts and Aggregate Liquidity
研究银行救助如何改变经济中的总体流动性，指出救助可能挽救银行体系，也可能引发系统性危机，这是此前未被关注的成本。
Governments sometimes bail out banks by recapitalizing them, or by offering to insure their liabilities. The government’s goal may be to rescue borrowers, bankers, or depositors, and economists have developed rationales why each of these constituencies may merit protection (e.g., Diamond, 2001). These potential benefits have to be weighed against the costs of a bailout, which are typically thought to be the damage to long-run incentives that such intervention engenders. In this paper, we present a different effect of bank bailouts: Bank bailouts alter the availability of aggregate liquidity in the economy. While a well-targeted bailout can help rescue an otherwise collapsing banking system (see Diamond and Rajan, 2001a), a poorly targeted bailout can even tip a banking system into a systemic crisis. This (ex post crisis) cost of bank bailouts, to the best of our knowledge, has not been examined elsewhere and is the focus of this paper.