Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All‐Pay Auction
用logit模型分析全支付拍卖中决策错误的影响，证明均衡存在性、唯一性和对称性，并解释为何有限理性下会出现租金过度消耗，对实验经济学和拍卖设计有参考价值。
The winner‐take‐all nature of all‐pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. The equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point: the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs. We prove existence, uniqueness, and symmetry properties. In contrast to the Nash equilibrium, the comparative statics of the logit equilibrium are intuitive: rent dissipation increases with the number of players and the bid cost. Overdissipation of rents is impossible under full rationality but is observed in laboratory experiments. Our model predicts this property.