Employment, Wage, and Accommodation Patterns of Permanently Impaired Workers
解释了永久性残疾工人受伤后的就业、工资和工作调整模式，认为事故发生时雇主以受伤前工资重新雇佣并调整工作安排，但可能很快解雇残疾工人的现象，反映了工人偏好的合同，该合同通过工资刚性激励工人适应残疾以提高终身效用。
This paper offers an explanation of the postinjury employment, wage, and accommodation patterns of permanently impaired workers. In particular, it argues that the observed tendency of time-of-accident employers to rehire at the preinjury wage, accommodate, then, perhaps, quickly terminate the impaired worker, is a manifestation of the workers' preferred contract. That contract is characterized by wage inflexibility. By removing the opportunity for the postinjury employer to underreport productivity, this contract creates an incentive for the worker to attempt to functionally adapt to the impairment, thereby increasing expected lifetime utility. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.