On the Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities: A Note
指出Myerson投票模型中候选人可能创造“受偏袒少数族群”作为纯策略对称均衡，但扩展模型允许候选人选择税收后，在温和条件下该博弈不存在纯策略对称均衡；不过Myerson的分类指数仍可用于衡量选举制度培养受偏袒少数族群的激励。
Myerson proved that, in a model of voting, candidates might create “favored minorities” as pure strategy symmetric equilibria. I point out a problem with his framework by extending the model to permit candidates to choose the amount of taxation. It is found that under some mild conditions the game fails to exhibit any pure strategy symmetric equilibrium. But I also show that the index used in Myerson's characterization is still a useful measure for classifying electoral systems with respect to incentives to cultivate favored minorities.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C62, C72, D72.