The economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation
研究管理者可能采取隐蔽行动影响实际盈余，并可能虚报盈余时，最优薪酬契约如何设计，发现基于报告盈余的契约无法同时激励利润最大化和诚实报告，因此必须容忍一定程度的盈余管理。
This article examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the actual earnings of the firm. When realized, these earnings constitute hidden information that is privately observed by the manager, who may expend resources to generate an inflated earnings report. We characterize the optimal managerial compensation contract in this setting, and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the incentive both to maximize profits and to report those profits honestly. As a result, some degree of earnings management must be tolerated as a necessary part of an efficient agreement.