Analyst Information Processing, Financial Regulation, and Academic Research
评述了两项研究，它们考察2000-2003年间六项重要监管法规对卖方分析师推荐偏差的影响，发现法规整体上减少了分析师利益冲突的影响，但具体哪项法规起作用尚不明确。
ABSTRACT: Changes in regulations governing capital markets always provide a rich setting for archival researchers to examine how such changes affect the behavior of market participants. Barniv et al. (2009; hereafter, BHMT) and Chen and Chen (2009; hereafter CC) examine the impacts of recently enacted regulations aimed at curbing perceived abused by sell-side analysts. There were no less than six significant regulations issued between 2000 and 2003 that affected the activities of analysts. BHMT and CC emphasize different regulations, but both predict that analysts' recommendation will be less biased as a result of the collective regulatory changes. The evidence in both studies is strong and convincing that the association between analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations has changed, consistent with analysts' personal conflicts of interest having less impact on their analyses. However, the attribution of what regulation, if any, effected this change is less clear. Collectively, the similarities and differences in the studies provide a nice setting to understand how different authors approach the same research question.