Bundling Health Insurance and Microfinance in India: There Cannot be Adverse Selection if There Is No Demand
通过印度卡纳塔克邦的随机对照试验，研究发现强制捆绑健康保险导致23%的客户退出小额信贷，因为客户宁愿放弃贷款也不愿支付更高利率获得保险，从而完全消除了保险中的逆向选择问题。
Microfinance institutions have started to bundle their basic loans with other financial services, such as health insurance. Using a randomized control trial in Karnataka, India, we evaluate the impact on loan renewal from mandating the purchase of actuarially-fair health insurance covering hospitalization and maternity expenses. Bundling loans with insurance led to a 16 percentage points (23 percent) increase in drop-out from microfinance, as many clients preferred to give up microfinance than pay higher interest rates and receive insurance. In a Pyrrhic victory, the total absence of demand for health insurance led to there being no adverse selection in insurance enrollment.