Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition
发现，当买方是最终消费者时，排他性合同因可违约而无法阻止进入；但当买方是下游竞争者时，即使无规模经济且可违约，排他性合同仍可能无效阻止进入。
Previous papers by Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer, and John S. Wiley, Jr. (1991) and Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston (2000) argue that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry in the presence of scale economies and multiple buyers. We first show that these results no longer hold when buyers are final consumers who can breach these contracts and pay expectation damages. We then show, however, that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry if buyers are downstream competitors, even in the absence of scale economies and even if breach is possible.