An Equilibrium Analysis of Wage-Productivity Gaps
构建了一个企业选择招聘标准、工资表和申请费的模型，刻画了纳什均衡集，并给出了均衡存在的充要条件。当每种能力类型的生产率分布服从高斯分布时，通过测试的工人工资高于其边际产品价值，而未通过者净工资低于其边际产品价值。
We develop a model in which each firm chooses a hiring standard as well as a wage schedule and an application fee, we then characterize the set of Nash equilibria, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium. If the distribution of productivities within each ability type is Gaussian, workers who pass the test will be paid more than the value of their marginal product, while workers who fail the test will receive a wage, net of the application fee, below the value of their marginal product.