Informal rules! Using institutional economics to understand service provision in Turkey's spontaneous settlements
研究土耳其自发定居点（gecekondus）的基础设施供给，发现正式规则基本无效，非正式规则在压力下形成并主导行为，对制度理论和实践有重要启示。
Turkey's spontaneous settlements (gecekondus) house half the urban population and face infrastructure deficiencies that reduce quality of life and economic productivity, while increasing the vulnerability of the urban poor This article reports on research that wed the new institutional economics to examine the formal and informal institutional frameworks for infrastructure provision in gecekondus. In theory, formal rules should create incentives that produce behaviour However, a key finding was that rules are generally irrelevant. In fact, in the absence of credible formal rules, pressures arise that help shape informal rules which then result in behaviour This has important implications for both institutional theory and daily practice.