The single-bid restriction on milk quota exchanges
研究了丹麦牛奶配额交易所中单一投标限制的扭曲效应，发现虽然理论上会导致交易量和配额分配次优，但基于安大略交易所数据的实证分析显示实际错配程度很低。
On the Danish milk quota exchange each producer can submit a single bid (a quantity and a price limit) only. We demonstrate that this restriction has several distorting effects. First, traders minimise the risk of foregoing profitable trade by submitting their average valuation rather than their marginal valuation of quota. Second, single bids cannot express full demand and supply curves. Therefore, not only the trade volume but also the allocation of quota may be sub-optimal. We evaluate the empirical importance of a single-bid restriction using data from the (multiple-bid) Ontario exchange. The misallocations identified are surprisingly low. This may be due to the character of milk production and the discrete nature of capacity adjustments. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.