Executive Compensation and Board Governance in US Firms
研究了美国公司高管薪酬与公司业绩、规模的正相关关系，发现股权激励和限制性股票的重要性增加，薪酬委员会独立且Dodd-Frank法案改变了治理格局，股东对薪酬计划投票通常通过。
This paper investigates US executive compensation and governance. I find on average executive pay is positively correlated to firm performance and firm size. Executive pay contracts contain significant equity incentives. The use of restricted stock has become more important over time. Stock options remain an important part of executive pay. Compensation committees are generally independent and there is little evidence they result in 'too high' CEO pay. The Dodd‐Frank Act changed the corporate governance landscape. Firms use compensation consultants that are generally engaged by the board and not management. 'Say‐on‐Pay' gave shareholders a non‐binding mandatory vote on executive pay. Typically, stockholders endorse executive pay plans with very few resolutions failing.