Analysts' Incentives and Street Earnings
研究分析师激励是否影响其报告的街头盈利，发现分析师更可能为热门股做增加盈利的调整，导致这些股票的街头盈利预测未来盈利的能力下降。
ABSTRACT We examine whether analysts' incentives are associated with street earnings. Because prior research argues that analysts' incentives to promote stocks increase in the extent to which the stock exhibits glamour characteristics, we predict that analysts are more likely to make income‐increasing adjustments in determining street earnings for glamour stocks than for value stocks. We find that analysts are more likely to exclude expense items from street earnings for glamour stocks than for value stocks and that excluded expense items help predict future earnings for glamour stocks but not for value stocks. Overall, our results suggest that analysts' self‐interest influences street earnings and this self‐interest leads to street earnings that are less useful in predicting future earnings for glamour stocks.