继任规划与代理理论:对哈里斯和赫尔法特关于多重职位公告市场回报解释的检验

Succession planning vs. agency theory: a test of Harris and Helfat's interpretation of plurality announcement market returns

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL · 2001
被引 53
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

检验了哈里斯和赫尔法特对多重职位公告负面市场反应的解释,发现只要存在明确继承人,双重和多重职位公告不会损害股东财富,更支持继任规划而非代理理论。

Abstract

In this note we respond to Harris and Helfat's (1998) reinterpretation of the results in Worrell, Nemec, and Davidson (1997). Harris and Helfat argued that the negative stock market response associated with plurality announcements could be the result of inadequate corporate succession planning rather than with the agency cost explanation. Our results, here, show that duality and plurality announcements do not hurt shareholder wealth as long as there is an heir apparent and, therefore, are more consistent with the succession planning explanation than with agency theory. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

公司治理代理理论继任规划股票市场反应