The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job Tenure, Quits, and Separations
基于Hirschman的退出-发言二分法，研究工会主义如何通过提供“发言”替代机制减少工人辞职和永久离职，并延长工作任期，实证证据表明工会会员的退出率显著降低，且申诉制度在其中起关键作用，最终降低成本并提高生产率。
This paper examines the effect of trade unionism on the exit behavior of workers in the context of Hirschman's exit-voice dichotomy. Unionism is expected to reduce quits and permanent separations and raise job tenure by providing a "voice" alternative to exit when workers are dissatisfied with conditions. Empirical evidence supports this contention, showing significantly lower exit for unionists in several large data tapes. It is argued that the grievance system plays a major role in the reduction in exit and that the reduction lowers cost and raises productivity.