The 1.5th Mover Advantage
质疑博弈中先动者承诺不可撤销的假设，引入部分承诺概念，分析内生承诺程度下的博弈，发现玩家可通过选择介于先动与后动之间的角色获得1.5阶先动优势。
There has been much discussion about the timing of moves in games. However, one assumption usually goes unquestioned, namely, that of an irrevocable commitment of the first mover. In many cases this is not realistic, since final commitments are often preceded by actions that are binding only to a limited degree: partial commitments. An example is the announcements of price changes. I analyze a game in which the degree of a partial commitment is endogenized. In the case of strategic complements, a player profitably makes use of the possibility to commit partly. She chooses a role somewhere between first and second mover, which gives her a 1.5th-mover advantage.