Auditing and Property Rights
研究第三方审计如何激励影响资产价值的代理人，发现当审计强度和结果不可验证时，最优机制可能仅依赖审计报告，并在高资产价值时让审计人获得资产、代理人获得货币补偿，对监管可再生资源或公用事业有启示。
Third-party auditprovides incentives to an agent whose actions affect the value of an asset. When audit intensity and outcome are unverifiable, we show that with interim-participation constraints the optimal mechanism may use only the auditor's report, disregarding the agent's information. Furthermore, the auditor obtains the asset and the agent a monetary compensation, when a high asset value is reported. This suggests regulating renewable resources or utility networks by giving entrants the option to buy the right to use the asset at a predetermined price, and financially rewarding incumbents for good performance.