Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and Organizational Design
研究一个委托人和两个代理人之间的相互监督机制，分析如何设计激励支付以避免合谋，发现代理人之间信息共享可能对委托人不利，有时放弃监督或引入第三方更优，甚至允许合谋可能是最佳策略。
We study the design of supervisory functions in an organization with one principal and two agents. Each agent can perform supervision activities regarding the other agent. We characterize the way the principal must structure incentive payments to avoid any collusive activity between agents. In particular, it is shown that better mutual information between agents may hurt the principal. The other main result is the possibility that it may be better to give up one supervisory function or to have a third party be the supervisor if possible. Finally, we show that such a dual supervisory structure raises the possibility that letting collusion happen may be the best policy.